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ABSTRACT
The basic assumption of this study is that any performance audit that involves 
some kind of interaction with the auditee also means that the SAI and the 
auditor needs to mitigate integrity, and thus independence-, risks. A more 
formative approach, as opposed to summative, could mean important risks to 
integrity as it will involve the auditees more. In the space for performance 
auditor discretion, the performance auditors need to balance parliamentary 
directives, good social scientific methods and external norms, as well as codes 
of ethics. This multiple case-study among state auditors in Sweden seeks to 
explore the auditorsʼ actions under the specific institutional and statutory 
conditions, and answer to the overarching question: are integrity and 
involvement contradictive values in state performance audits? How are risks for 
integrity mitigated on an auditor level at the Swedish National Audit Office 
(SNAO)? The data material consists of five cases of performance audit. Two 
auditors have been interviewed for each case, about their own professional 
approach in general and related to the particular case. The interview material 
has been completed using performance audit report drafts and comments, the 
performance audit reports, the Governmentʼs responses, Parliamentary 
Committee statements, policy propositions and parliamentary debate protocols.
The main findings are that the performance auditors at the SNAO see their own 
role as clearly facilitating and formative, even in the cases that were of the most 
summative nature. Both kinds of approaches fit in the parliamentary directive 
for the performance audits, and the mandate of the SNAO to conduct 
independent audits is perceived as strong. Esteem in the own organisation was 
high. Performance auditors at the SNAO work actively to create dialogue and 
trust among the auditees; this approach also helps them anchor their 
conclusions among the auditees and legitimize their findings. Role conflicts 
appeared mostly  externally to the performance auditors, for instance on 
different organisational levels at the auditee, where sometimes defensive 
reactions manifested. Integrity and ethics were not considered problematic by 
most interviewees; the reason for this was frequently the support available 
among colleagues in the work group. This social dimension for maintaining 
integrity and ethical standards appeared more important to the auditors than 
official ethical guidelines. This dimension should be considered in further work 
with ethics at the SNAO.   
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1 Introduction
Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs) constitute the citizens’ and the Parliament’s prime 
organ for overseeing the work of the Government. They  have a unique mandate to audit 
government activities and policy interventions. They are supposed to be an independent 
entity under the legislature, and have access to information that the general public does 
not. SAIs do not only conduct financial audits of the public administration and the 
Government, but also what is usually referred to as performance audits (PA), where the 
“three Es” - economy, efficiency, effectiveness -  and good governance are evaluated. 
As a political actor, an SAI rarely has the mandate to impose recommendations upon a 
government. Instead, it works as a provider of information (Ahlbäck 1999: 55f), and it 
is up to the Government and Parliament whether to drive through a policy change based 
on that information. An SAI can seek, however, to maximise the influence of its 
activities in other ways, both on an organisational and an employee level. This is done 
by strategic choices of topics for PA, working together with the auditee during the audit 
process, attracting press attention to the result of the performance audit, and presenting 
the report to the Parliament. (Pollitt et al. 1999) 
 
Performance auditors are formally auditors, but their work resembles that of an 
evaluator, as they are to evaluate the Government’s activities against the goals of the 
Parliament. Evaluation research has shown that involving the evaluated in the process 
can increase the utility  of the evaluation, as well as improve conditions for influence 
(Weiss 1998). An involving approach can reduce the risk of being perceived as a “fault -
finder”, that in turn could impede the acceptance and influence of the results (Pollitt et 
al. 1999: English 2007). At the same time, taking a more involving stance towards the 
auditee can be a risk for auditor integrity. There is hence a theoretical contradiction 
between the theory about a well-functioning state audit institution and the theory of how 
to maximise the influence of an evaluation process. This contradiction can be pictured 
as a continuum with independence/integrity on one side, and involvement/influence on 
the other (Reichborn and Kjennerud 2011). Research and theorising about performance 
audits is an area with much left to explore, however, two ideal types of performance 
auditors frequently represent these extremes in the literature: the independent 
summative outcome auditor and the involving formative process evaluator (Furubo 
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2011b; Johansson 2006: 43; Reichborn and Kjennerud 2011: 221). State performance 
auditors need to balance between these two. As long as there is any  amount of 
interaction between the auditor and the audited body, there is a risk for auditor integrity 
and independence from the auditee. PAs however, by nature, can hardly be conducted 
without any type of interaction between the auditor and the auditee, and so it is a risk 
that needs to be mitigated, formally  and informally. What are the practical implications 
of this theoretical paradox inherent in state performance audits? Is it a “real” 
contradiction? If not, what is the “missing link” that makes an SAI work independently 
and in an inclusive, facilitating manner?
In Sweden, the former SAI Riksrevisionsverket (RRV)1  was subject to criticism for 
working too closely with the auditees, with an integrity-damaging sensitivity to the 
wills of Ministries and, in some cases, the audited institutions (Ahlbäck 1999). Prior to 
2011, the institutional and statutory provisions for state performance audit included a 
process in which the performance audit reports were tabled straight to the Government, 
instead of to the Parliament, increasing the risk of Governmental influence over the 
results (Clark et  al. 2007). This practice risked the theoretical model for credible state 
audits. The tabling process changed in the beginning of 2011 to be direct to Parliament. 
Other recent changes are the focus of the PAs and the steering of the Swedish National 
Audit Office (SNAO). The institutional and procedural changes in Swedish state audit, 
along with the previous evidence of auditor -auditee interactions that risked the integrity 
of the auditors at the old RRV, makes Sweden’s SAI an interesting case to study. 
1.1 Research Questions
This thesis seeks to explore the theoretical contradiction between independence and 
integrity  on the one hand, and the degree of involvement and influence on the other. 
This study is too limited to be able to make conclusions about public auditors in 
general, or even regarding the SNAO as a whole. The aim is rather to illuminate a 
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1 In 2003, the RRV was reformed to be an all-inclusive evaluative body of the state, the Swedish 
National Audit Office (SNAO) as opposed to previously dividing the auditing areas between the 
RRV and three parliamentary elected auditors.
theoretical problem by  examining one part. An overarching research question is: are 
integrity  and an inclusive approach contradictive values in public performance audits? 
The level of analysis is individual auditors, within the context that the SNAO. This will 
be an exploratory study of a qualitative nature where the purpose is not to say how 
public auditors always act, but merely how public auditors can act, given a certain set  of 
preconditions.
Research question 1: How do performance auditors perceive of their own role? Are 
there any role conflicts?
Research question 2: Were integrity  and an inclusive approach contradictive values in 
the performance audits under study? If not, how were they combined?
1.2 Thesis Disposition
The paper follows the trail of independence and integrity from an institutional to an 
individual level. It is structured to first give an introduction to the general institutional 
preconditions for SNAO independence, after which the theoretical place of PAs in the 
policy process will be clarified, and then the approaches and ethics of performance 
auditors. Chapter two aims to clarify  the conceptual and systemic context of SAIs and 
PAs. Chapter three attempts to draw out what institutional preconditions shape the 
discretion of performance auditors. Chapter four describes the design and method of the 
study in detail. In chapter five, the results of the case-study of five PA reports and 
processes are presented. Chapter six returns to the theoretical construct and attempts to 
draw conclusions of the study. In chapter seven there is a critical discussion of the 
results.
2 Supreme Audit Institutions - Purpose and Placement
The ultimate purpose of Supreme Audit Institutions is for the Parliament to oversee the 
Government’s work, and keep the Government accountable for its spending of the 
taxpayers’ money. Accountability can be defined as “...an obligation to present an 
account of and answer for the execution of responsibilities to those who entrusted those 
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responsibilities.” (Gray  and Jenkins 1993: 55). It is a two-fold relationship of a steward, 
to whom responsibility is entrusted, and a principal, the party that gives the 
responsibility. In representative democracies the citizenry  is the principal, represented 
by the Parliament, and the Government is the steward, entrusted with steering the state. 
SAIs are assigned to assure the regularity and accountability of the Government and 
public sector by conducting audits and other assurance services (Clark et. al 2007: 41). 
As state-level actors, SAIs primarily  conduct financial audits against fraud and 
corruption, as well as performance audits (PA) that have an evaluative function. Their 
mandate for the audit comes from either a government directive or has its ground in the 
constitution. Some processes drive the activities of SAIs towards local as well as 
international levels. Locally, they interact with a more decentralised administration due 
to New Public Management-oriented reforms. Internationally, there is pooling of 
knowledge and creation of auditing standards between SAIs, such as the International 
Organisation of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI), as well as development co-
operation efforts. INTOSAI is an umbrella organisation for SAIs, voluntary in nature, 
using best practises and deliberation on standards and norms for public auditing as their 
primary instruments, thus supporting the independence and professionalism of public 
auditors worldwide. This diversification of activities of SAIs can be seen to have 
developed over time and intensified since the end of the 1970s. 
Based on the actual areas of SAI activities, it appears to be more fruitful to consider 
them not as policy-instruments against  fraud and corruption, but rather as actors for 
change with many different possible influences, intended and unintended. SAIs are, due 
to their pledge, possibly  controversial actors, in a hostile environment with governments 
sometimes seeking to minimise the powers of the SAI, particularly  when there is 
criticism against its achievements (English 2007: Funnell 1997). The institutional and 
statutory preconditions for SAIs’ activities structure the relationships to the 
Government, other auditees, and the Parliament. The nature of these relations are 
decisive for the quality of audit work carried out. Independence and accountability are 
the two key characteristics necessary for a well-functioning SAI. 
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2.1 Independent Audits for Accountability
Performed according to sound auditing standards through an independent agency, state 
auditing should assure an evaluation sound enough to function as a basis for 
accountability of the Government’s utilisation of public means. The SAI itself is 
accountable to the Parliament but should retain a considerable amount of independence 
in its operations. Independence for an SAI in practise means the freedom to select what 
to audit and when, how to conduct the audit, and decide over the conclusions of the 
audit. In an ideal model, SAIs have a unique position to oversee the Government and 
the administration, but the institutional provisions for the SAI mandate vary  amongst 
states; just like administrative set-ups vary. INTOSAI specifies in its Lima and Mexico 
Declarations that  national variations in public auditing standards are embraced by the 
organisation. However it points out  eight institutional features that are considered 
crucial for a credible SAI to function. These are:
• the existence of an appropriate and effective legal framework that spells out the extent 
of SAI independence;
• a broad legislative mandate and full discretion in the discharge of SAI functions;
• the independence of SAI heads and members including security of tenure and legal 
immunity in the normal discharge of their duties;
• unrestricted access to information;
• the right and obligation to report on the Government’s work;
• the freedom to decide on the content and timing of audit reports and the right to 
publish and disseminate them;
• the existence of a follow-up mechanism for recommendations; and
• financial and administrative autonomy  and the availability of appropriate human, 
material, and monetary resources. (adapted from INTOSAI Lima and Mexico: I-5-6)
SAI independence from the Government and the auditee(s) and SAI accountability to 
the legislator, are recurring requirements in the literature on public audit and core 
principles of the INTOSAI standards (see Clark et al 2007; INTOSAI Lima and Mexico 
Declarations). Free access to information, at any  time the auditor chooses, is an 
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important criteria for the auditor to have a truly independent role. An auditor or SAI 
may not refrain from auditing an organisation, or an issue, based on the unwillingness 
of the auditee to provide the needed information. Auditors can oblige auditees to 
provide what they need in order to proceed with the audit process. (Johansson 2006: 45) 
The auditees also have the right to be listened to. Performance auditors need to anchor 
their results in the audited organisation so that they are perceived as valid findings:
“Auditors should make use of information brought forward by the audited 
entity and other parties. This information is to be taken into account in the 
opinions expressed by the auditors in an impartial way. The auditor should 
also gather information about the views of the audited entity and other 
parties. However, the auditors’ own conclusions should not be affected by 
such views. “ (ISSAI Code of Ethics: 5)
This extract from the ISSAI Code of Ethics demonstrates a cutting-point where 
auditors’ integrity might be at risk. 
To sum up, public auditors are in the business of assuring public accountability  by 
independent audit  activities. Their mandate for the audit comes from either a 
government directive or has its ground in the constitution and the actions of state 
auditors are structured by the mandate. Auditors have it stated in law what their 
evaluation criteria should be, and to some extent their approach. Much of their action is 
therefore dictated by parliamentary directives, as well as external (INTOSAI) norms for 
public auditing and general methodology of social scientific enquiry. After this brief 
investigation into the institutional and theoretical setting of SAIs, we can orient 
ourselves in the landscape of state audits and look more specifically  at the setting of the 
Swedish National Audit Office (SNAO).
2.2 SNAO Independence
State audits have a long history in Sweden, and has been present in some form since the 
1500s. Performance audits have been undertaken since the seventies. State audit in 
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Sweden has undergone some turmoil in the past couple of decades, both regarding 
institutional form and mandate, as well as processes for performance audits. The current 
SAI, the Swedish National Audit Office (SNAO) exists since 2003, when it replaced its 
two predecessors the Parliamentary Auditors (Riksdagens Revisorer) consisting of 
elected members of parliament, and a National Audit Office called Riksrevisionsverket 
(RRV). The Parliamentary Auditors were politically elected and not dependent upon the 
Government for their existence and operations, but the resources they possessed for 
investigations were limited (Ahlbäck Öberg 2011: 337). The RRV, on the other hand, 
possessed resources for conducting proper performance audits, but were in reality 
highly  dependent on the Government for their budget, and their very existence, as the 
mandate came from a governmental directive. In addition, the security of tenure for 
Auditors General that aimed criticism against the Government was low, as was 
demonstrated by the firing of Auditor General Inga-Britt Ahlenius of the RRV in 1999, 
after controversy regarding the independence of the RRV (Ahlbäck Öberg 2011). In 
2003, the Riksrevisionen (SNAO) was formed, now with a constitutional mandate and 
improved conditions for independence. However, there were still some procedural 
obstacles to independent performance auditing. 
Until 2011, a politically elected Board was responsible for some key parts of the SNAO 
work. The Board consisted of eleven MPs elected by parliament. The PA reports from 
SNAO were presented to the Government and to the Board; the latter would then decide 
which reports should be presented to the Parliament, and how. Reports could be 
presented with proposals for the Parliament to vote on, or they could be merely 
presented with recommendations for action, leaving it up to the Parliamentary 
Committees to proceed with the matter. The Government was to report to the Parliament 
which actions had been taken as a result of the reports from the SNAO once a year, as a 
part of the yearly budget proposal. The same government report was given to the Board 
of the SNAO, who got to make a statement regarding the Government’s responsiveness 
to the policy recommendations of the PA. Tabling of PA report results was thus indirect; 
first via the internal filtering of the Board, then the Government, before going to the 
Parliament. This arrangement was exceptional among SAIs, and it meant a perceived 
inefficiency and risk for SNAO independence (Ahlbäck 1999; Clark et al. 2007):
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“Other concerns are with instances where the tabling of the SAI’s reports to 
parliament is indirect or where the enabling legislation is silent, since this 
again creates opportunities for political intervention in the reporting 
process. Of particular concern is the finding for Sweden, where the tabling 
of such reports is via the Government.” (Clark et al 2007: 53)
There were indeed some important obstacles to independence. However, from 2011 and 
onwards, all the reports published are tabled directly to the Parliament2, meaning the 
project group  from the SNAO together with the Auditor General present the report to 
the appropriate Parliamentary Committee. In turn, the Parliament tables it to the 
Government, that then has four months’ time to respond to the Parliament about what 
actions have been taken, and what actions are intended. After that, the relevant 
Parliamentary Committee considers the matter, and the Parliament takes a vote, if 
necessary. Often policy changes occur before the entire process has taken place, as 
issues are pointed out by  the performance auditors during the evaluation process. This 
can occur either on governmental or administrative level. 
The PA process is divided into five parts: environmental scan and analysis, pre-study, 
main study, final processing and post-processing3 . The auditees are obliged to 
collaborate by law: 
6 § State authorities under the government shall when requested provide the 
help and the data and information that the SNAO needs for the audit. Others 
that are audited according to this law have a corresponding duty concerning 
the parts of the own operations that are audited.4 
13
2 In accordance with modification 2011:750, in the law 2002:1023 with instructions for the 
Swedish National Audit Office.
3 E-mail from PA process owner 17.04.2012: Omvärldsbevakning – förstudie – granskningens 
genomförande - slutprocess – efterprocess  
4 Law 2002:1022 concerning audit of state activities
Views and knowledge of the audited entities and the Government are considered by 
sending out  drafts to each stake holder twice; once when the report is drafted without 
the conclusions and recommendations, and then again when the comments from the first 
round have been considered and worked into the report, and the conclusions and 
recommendations written. Not all PAs pass through every  stage of the described internal 
PA process, for instance, if a problem is perceived during the environmental scan, it  can 
be investigated in a pre-study, but then dropped, if it turns out that data is not possible to 
collect for a scientifically sane performance audit, or if the problem is of a passing kind.
Today, the SNAO is an organisation with 320 employees, lead by three Auditors 
General that are elected on a seven-year basis without any possibility of re-election. The 
Auditors General have the power to decide what is to be performance audited, and they 
have divided the issue-areas of the budget between them. For 2010, the budget of the 
SNAO was 335 million SKR, out of which the largest part was occupied by  costs for 
PA (SNAO 2010). For parliamentary insight into the work of the SNAO, a 
Parliamentary Council is elected by parliament for each mandate period, consisting of 
one member from each political party represented in the Parliament, currently seven. 
The Auditors General are to present how the audit plan is followed, as well as discuss 
suggestions for increases in the budget of the SNAO with the Council, before it goes to 
the Parliament for decision. The Council does not have any decision-making mandate 
(Thulin 2010). 
A survey performed among 65 auditors at the SNAO by Louise Bringselius in 2011 
revealed internal criticism concerning the quality of the PA reports, the relevance of 
audit topics, a lack of dialogue with external stake holders and with the agency being 
audited, the way that the three Auditors General lead and organised operations at the 
SNAO, the new performance audit approach, and the performance of the SNAO itself 
14
(Bringselius 2011)5. The results of the survey could be interpreted as reflecting an 
organisation in an adaptation phase with the new institutions and processes.  
It seems that the formal dimension for independence has been improved at the SNAO 
since the beginning of 2011; the tabling of reports is direct and without internal filtering 
to the Parliament, the response process of the Government is faster, enhancing the 
momentum of an issue. There seems to be some internal discord, though, related to the 
recent changes implemented in both institutions and processes. With this knowledge, it 
is possible to consider the nature of the specific activity of performance audits.
2.3 Performance Audits in Research Discourse
Available studies on state audits frequently  deal with the organisational level, law and 
processes (Pollitt  et al. 1999; Clark et al. 2007). While suitable for comparative studies 
between states, a strictly  organisational perspective masks the individual actions and the 
meaning of those for the institutions. SAI practitioners, like Jan-Eric Furubo (SNAO) 
and Jeremy Lonsdale (NAO) have made valuable contributions to the individual auditor 
level. Ahlbäck (1999, 2011a-b) and Bringselius (2011) have provided accounts of the 
SNAO by scrutinising the independence of the old RRV, examining the managerial 
structure of the SNAO, and the internal trust in the organisation. 
Performance audits seek “...to establish whether public policies or programmes or 
projects or organisations have been (or are being) conducted with due regard to 
economy, efficiency, effectiveness, and good management practice.” (Pollitt and 
Summa, 1999). INTOSAI defines PAs as “...oriented towards examining the 
performance, economy, efficiency and effectiveness of public administration. 
Performance audit covers not only specific financial operations, but the full range of 
government activity including both organisational and administrative 
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5 To the statement ”Decisions regarding audits are made without any external influence 
whatsoever”, 22.1 percent mostly or fully disagreed, 18.6 percent hesitated and 59.3 percent 
mostly or fully agreed. Another statement the respondents were asked to rate was ”Conclusions 
in audit reports are never adapted in order to become more interesting to the media or other 
external stakeholders.” 22.2 percent mostly or fully disagreed, 14.3 percent were hesitant and 
63.5 percent mostly or fully agreed. (Bringselius 2011: 13)
systems.” (INTOSAI : I–11). Performance audit is thus aimed at policies, programmes, 
projects and organisations, rather than auditing a financial result. PAs differ further from 
financial audits in terms of regularity, in that they are selectively  initiated and never at 
one point of time include all government agencies. They also possess a greater variety 
between them in scope, length, focus and level of standardisation of methods (Pollitt et 
al, 1999: 17).  
Essentially, as pointed out by Pollitt  et  al. (1999), financial audits and PAs are instituted 
for the same purpose, that of accountability, and for the value for money  of the 
Government’s interventions. This view is shared by Furubo, in whose definition of 
performance audits accountability holds a central place: “...an evaluative activity which 
produces assessments regarding performance or information about performance, of 
such a reliable degree and with such a freedom from investigatory and reporting 
constraints, that they can be used in the realm of accountability.” (Furubo 2011: 35). 
Auditing is by definition always independent, while other types of evaluation where the 
purpose is learning or improvement, can benefit from being dependent (Furubo 2011: 
34). As seen in chapter two, independence is a prerequisite for being able to produce 
information that can be used for accountability. Other purposes, such as learning and 
improvement, must  be seen as secondary, as otherwise one could question whether it 
makes sense to conduct performance audits at all, and not just evaluations where the 
only focus is to bring out new information and improvement (Furubo 2011). PA is the 
type of audit that leaves the greatest space for interaction between auditor and auditee, 
as the methods employed need to resemble those of a researcher and include more than 
just collecting a set of numbers.
Performance audits in the policy  process are sometimes conceived of as having an ex-
post place in an ideal- type output oriented decision making model (Vedung in 
Lejdhamre 2002: 4). The reports form the basis for government accountability, via 
parliamentary  decision-making. In research it is often assumed that this is the only 
measurable influence of an SAI (Pollitt et al. 1999). This means that the policy 
intervention is pictured as a circular trajectory, starting with preparation of decision-
making material, and “ending” with a retrospective evaluation phase. In the second 
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cycle, in an ideal case of instrumental PA finding use, the information from the 
evaluative phase is made use of to either continue the programme as it is, to continue it 
with modifications, or to cancel the programme (Lejdhamre 2002). As Lejdhamre 
(2002) and other authors have noticed, actual decision-making processes are rarely very 
straightforward and the use of evaluation reports is not always instrumental. This form 
of use, however, seems to be the normatively preferred one and the one that can most 
easily be measured (Lejdhamre: 6ff). Leeuw (1996) criticises this simplified view of 
policy-and decision making process, which he refers to as the auditor’s implicit 
feedback theory, an assumption on which most auditing is based, calling it “naive and 
mechanistic” (1996: 100). It fails to take into account adverse effects of the auditor-
auditee relationship, such as strategic acting on behalf of the auditee as a response to the 
audit, but not actual performance improvement. There is some evidence for this type of 
adverse effects of public audits (Funell 1997; English 2007). The cost imposed on the 
auditee by the audit process and the possibly demoralising effect on the auditee as a 
result of the audit has been recognised as an other unintended, adverse consequences 
(Pollitt et al. 1999). 
The assumption of merely instrumental use of evaluation ignores the wider context of 
influence, particularly  in the case of SAIs, that remain stable over several years and 
repeatedly interact with the same organisations. SAIs as organisations have stronger 
relations to its surroundings than a sole external evaluator, or an ad-hoc governmental 
evaluation group. Every occurrence of a performance audit will have effects on 
auditees’ and Government’s perception of the SAI, as much as the SAI’s perception of 
the auditee and the Government. A general level conclusion is that an audit  process 
always influences its stake holders in some ways, measurable and un -measurable, 
positive or adverse. One could say that use always equals influence, but influence does 
not always equal use. This approach to evaluation influence has been advocated by 
Kirkhart (2000), and Marks and Henry (2004). It is also supported by empirical 
evidence from Bringselius (2011: 13): Nearly 90 percent of the responding auditors6 at 
the SNAO mostly  or fully agreed with the statement ”The SSAI performance audit is 
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6 The total number of respondents were 65 (Bringselius 2011: 1)
meaningful even if measures are not immediately undertaken”. Noteworthy is the word 
“meaningful”; something that is meaningful is usually not adverse. Such a result 
underlines the meaning of positive long-term effects. 
Process influence should not be ignored. It needs to be investigated with the possibility 
of adverse as well as positive consequences for the auditee in mind. The targets and 
goals of the Parliament are what gives the PA its legitimacy as an evaluation process. 
Therefore, seen from a legitimacy perspective, consequences or influence that are in 
line with the recommendations of the report, even if they occur before the report  is 
published and are unintended or unexpected, are positive. 
2.4 Auditor Approaches
Literature on performance audits distinguishes between two types of auditor 
approaches; the operations-rational formative process evaluation and the goal-oriented 
summative evaluation. The formative process evaluation has as its main goal to improve 
an ongoing activity, but the auditor is assumed to lose judgement if getting too involved 
with the auditee. The summative outcome evaluation is more of a review, and more 
focused on holding somebody  accountable for present or lacking outcomes. (Furubo 
2011b; Johansson 2006: 43; Reichborn and Kjennerud 2011: 221) It is not possible 
though, to argue that one does not have any element of the other. Essentially, the 
discourse on the subject of performance audits is focused around these two purposes. 
Both can occur within the same SAI, as the purpose of PA reports can vary: 
“(...) we can analyse and study state-or other activities with different 
purposes in mind. We can place the knowledge production on a scale where 
there extremes can be named “the good guy notion”, where knowledge is 
assumed to lead to better decisions and a better praxis, and “the bad guy 
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notion”, where it is assumed that the means for action is not the knowledge, 
but the concern for what our principal is going to say.” (Furubo 2011b: 19)7
The ideal types auditor and evaluator capture these supposed contrary approaches to 
performance audits. Reichborn and Kjennerud (2011: 40) note that auditors’ focus is 
legal and procedural compliance, while evaluators or consultants are more focused on 
improvement. Furubo (2011: 42) argues, similarly, that the focus of the performance 
audit will differ, depending on whether one is looking to be the former or the latter. 
These different roles can manifest  as conflicts in a performance audit situation, for 
instance if whether co-operation difficulties should be brought up  as findings, or not: “It 
also shows the role conflict the auditors meet in such a situation – being helpers in a 
process focusing on improvement, in which case co-operation difficulties would be 
important information, versus being controllers.” (Reichborn and Kjennerud 2011: 226)
Summarised, the underlying logic of the two different auditor approaches or auditor 
roles are 
1) Summative: independence - integrity - statement - report influence
2) Formative: independence - integrity - involvement - process and report influence
Both are independent, and require integrity  during the PA process, but the formative 
approach places larger strains on the integrity because it involves the auditee with the 
auditor to a higher degree. Influence as a result of the PA also has different paths in the 
summative and formative auditor roles. A formative audit has more ways of influencing 
an auditee, than a summative where influence is limited to the report recommendations. 
The formative audit leaves greater space for process influence. 
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Authorʼs translation from “Detta resonemang innebär alltså att vi kan analysera och studera 
statlig eller annan verksamhet med olika syften. Vi kan placera ut kunskapsproduktionen på en 
skala där ytterligheterna kan sägas vara ”the good guy notion” där kunskapen antas leda till 
bättre beslut och en bättre praktik och ”the bad guy notion” där det antas att det inte är 
kunskapen som sådan som är verkans-medlet utan oron för vad vår principal skall säga.” 
(Furubo 2011b: 19)
Working closely together with the evaluated enhances for the use of the evaluation, but 
also constitutes a risk for auditor integrity, and thus SAI independence. How, then, is the 
approach of the performance auditor related to the process influence? What part can 
they  play in promoting positive process influence, and reducing adverse influence, 
while still maintaining a sufficient degree of integrity?
3 What Makes the SNAO Performance Auditor?
“We audit the whole chain of the executive power. We are an independent organisation 
under the Riksdag and we are independent in relation to those we audit.” 
     (Swedish National Audit Office, home page8) 
There are various factors that determine the performance auditor approach at the SNAO. 
As the SNAO is the Parliament’s independent authority  for controlling the work of the 
Government, the Parliament has a steering role for the SNAO. While conducting their 
work independently, the direction for the PAs is drawn out by the Parliament. Moreover, 
the SNAO relates to external norms for Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs) such as 
INTOSAI and general social science research norms. 
On an individual performance auditor level, the only official “steering” consists of 
ethical guidelines. These come both from INTOSAI and the SNAO itself. Except for 
ethical guidelines, auditor approaches are shaped by common praxis resulting in 
professional norms. Such professional norms are subjects to change over time 
(Johansson 2006: 43). Lundquist in his book from 1998 coined the expression 
guardians of democracy, a concept applicable to any public servant, underlining the 
particular role that these have, as opposed to employees of the private sector. Lundquist 
stressed the importance of an agreed-upon public ethos9. In Lundquist’s view, implicit 
norms for how a public servant should behave are not sufficient; the norms for praxis 
should be explicit  and clear. The public ethos, Lundquist notes, requires integrity on 
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8 Swedish National Audit Office at http://www.Swedish National Audit Office.se/en/Start/About-
us/, accessed 24.04.2012.
9 Ethos can be defined as the character and disposition of a group or individual.
behalf of a public servant (in this case the performance auditor), which in turn means to 
show moral courage, to “do what is right”, despite pressures from powerful stake 
holders to do otherwise (ibid.: 101). In the case of performance auditors, the integrity 
needs to be particularly strong, as they are bound to find themselves at one point or 
another in a situation of conflicting views and uncomfortable truths. As Ahlbäck (2011a: 
337) notes: 
“Producing and delivering knowledge about how well the 
administration handles its responsibilities is however no politically 
neutral mission, since it implies severe consequences for the political 
credibility of those in power, if the promoted policies are being 
pictured as a success or a failure.”   
It is questionable though, to what degree formally agreeing on a set of ethical guidelines 
matters for the individual auditor’s interpretation of his or her role. Is it really possible 
to steer over auditor’s behaviour? Or are there other factors that are more meaningful 
for shaping the auditor’s ethos? Ethical guidelines for performance auditors can be seen 
as attempts to steer over the professional norms for auditor interaction, but these are 
always subject to interpretations by individuals, according to the person’s professional 
ethos.
Below, the factors or instruments for determining the approach of the performance 
auditors at the SNAO are investigated, starting with the parliamentary direction, the 
social scientific stance, and finally the official ethical guidelines. 
3.1 Parliamentary Direction for SNAO Performance Audits
In 2009 , a Pa r l i amenta ry  Rev iew of the ac t iv i t i e s o f the SNAO 
(Riksrevisionsutredningen) came with a final statement regarding the focus of 
performance audits at the SNAO. The purpose of the review was to clarify  the focus of 
the performance audits, and whether the reports constituted sufficiently trustworthy and 
accessible material for parliamentary  deliberation and decision-making 
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(Riksrevisionsutredningen 2008: 48). When the SNAO was formed in 2003, the 
direction for PA was simply copied from the old RRV without much consideration 
(ibid.: 6). It concluded that  between 2003-2007, the dominating focus of PAs at the 
SNAO had been regulatory accountability, while the three Es, promoted by  among 
others INTOSAI, had been much less central (ibid.: 51). There was a desire for the 
SNAO to focus on areas that relate to sound state finances and societal development, as 
an overarching agency. The Parliamentary Review pointed to the various other research 
institutes evaluating specific policy  areas. Moreover, the review was not satisfied with 
the recommendations issued, as they  tended to lead to increased costs, and were difficult 
to follow up on (ibid.: 9). The review suggested the PA practise to take a new direction, 
less focused on regulatory accountability, and more focused on the efficiency, 
effectiveness and economy. “Promoting responsibility can, according to the review, 
create space for dialogue and positive discussions on change as a consequence of the 
observations and conclusions of the audit”10  (ibid.: 9). Accountability would be left 
clearly to the Government and Parliament, and only when responsibility failed. 
Focus of the Audit
§ 4 The audits referred to in § 2 shall primarily focus on relations connected 
to the state’s budget, implementation and results of state operations and 
responsibilities generally, but may also concern state interventions 
generally. Audits should facilitate such a development that the state, 
concerning the public interest, receives an effective exchange for its 
interventions (performance audit). The Performance Audit shall primarily 
be focused on auditing the economy, efficiency, effectiveness and good 
governance. As a link in the performance audits proposals for alternative 
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10 “Att främja ansvarstagande kan, enligt utredningens mening, skapa utrymme för dialog och 
positiva förändringsdiskussioner som en följd av granskningens iakttagelser och 
slutsatser.“ (Riksrevisionsutredningen 2008: 9)
interventions may be presented to reach the desired policy results.11 
(2002:1022)
This is clearly  a move in a more formative evaluator direction, and away from the 
summative auditor. Internally at the SNAO, there seems to be some discord regarding 
the PA audit process focus. Bringselius’ (2011) survey  among performance auditors at 
the SNAO included taking a stance on the statement:”The SSAI performance audit is in 
practice (distinguish words from practice) no longer focused on accountability”. The 
responses were 28 percent (mostly or fully) disagreed, 39.6 percent hesitated and 32.1 
percent (mostly or fully) agreed. It  should also be noted that 12 out of 65 respondents 
chose not to answer. Interestingly, the responses are dispersed and there were many 
hesitant. This indicates diversion in what accountability  really should mean in practice 
in a single report. It could also reflect variation in PA focus, where some auditors have 
primarily  worked with summative accountability-oriented PAs, and some with 
formative evaluation-like PAs. 
How does the parliamentary  PA direction show in the choice of audit subject? The 
subjects of audit are chosen by the three Auditors General, in collaboration with the 
SNAO staff. The SNAO works with performance audit strategies or themes, where one 
strategy involves several performance audits of one issue-area. In the 2011-12 plan for 
PA the SNAO motivates its choices of topics: 
- The PA is meant to be problem -oriented, focused on the policy  areas where 
performance is perceived as less-than optimal.
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11 “Granskningens inriktning, 4 § Den granskning som avses i 2 § ska främst ta sikte på 
förhållanden med anknytning till statens budget, genomförandet och resultatet av statlig 
verksamhet och åtaganden i övrigt men får också avse de statliga insatserna i allmänhet. 
Granskningen ska främja en sådan utveckling att staten med hänsyn till allmänna 
samhällsintressen får ett effektivt utbyte av sina insatser (effektivitetsrevision).
Effektivitetsrevisionen ska huvudsakligen inriktas på granskning av hushållning, 
resursutnyttjande, måluppfyllelse och samhällsnytta. Som ett led i effektivitetsrevisionen får 
förslag lämnas om alternativa insatser för att nå avsedda resultat.” (SFS 2002:1022)
- Objects for evaluation are singled-out by  following up on current research and 
debate, as well as via direct contact and discussions with MPs, administration staff, 
representatives of the Government Offices, researchers and citizens.
- A further criteria for selection of objects is that it  should be an area where there is 
not so much other research available. The SNAO motivates this by  referring to the 
citizen aspect, stating that it  is “...important to illuminate problems that have 
received less attention for individuals and groups in society, meaning being on the 
level where the Governmental operations meet the end receiver, the citizen”
- Another criteria for selection of object is the degree of discretion in the audited body. 
The more discretion the organisation has to shape its own policy, the greater the 
interest of the SNAO. More complex policy  arrangements are bound to attract more 
interest from the SNAO. (SNAO 2011b: 11)
At the beginning of 2012 the audit strategies were: Establishment and Integration, The 
Abilities of the Defence Forces, Sustainable Development - Climate, New Conditions 
for Infrastructure, Public Finance, State Interventions in Public Education, The State 
and Health Care, The State in the Market, The Role of the State in Education12. 
The selection criteria for PA leave a great space for Auditor General discretion, as well 
as for performance auditors to make suggestions for audit topics. There are no monetary 
value criteria, which in practise means that any “problem area” can be audited, even 
those that concern a small amount of people, serving as a democratic warrant. However, 
since the purpose for the SNAO performance audits is to safeguard the taxpayers’ 
interest, economic arguments should weigh heavily in the choice of audit areas. In the 
Swedish statutory law Administration Act (2007:515) it is decided that:
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12 SNAO 2012 at http://www.Swedish National Audit Office.se/GRANSKNINGAR/Tematiska-
granskningar/, accessed 09.04.2012. SNAO also has the possibility of conducting “stray-audits” 
when there is a perceived need for investigation (Telephone interview with project manager, 
04.2012)
§ 19: The administrative authority shall see to that the cost-related 
consequences are limited when it requests information or practises 
inspection.13
Occasional criticism has been aimed at the SNAO for avoiding politically  sensitive 
topics, such as gender equality14 An interviewee pointed out  that  there is a lot of internal 
debate regarding what topics to audit, but that subjects are sometimes not audited due to 
problems with the operationalising of concepts into quantifiable data. This could mean 
that quantifiable, measurable data are promoted over qualitative, rendering some policy 
areas less “auditable”. Moreover, there is a possibility  that the sorts of information 
preferable to the auditor “...lead to demands for how the politics should be formulated 
to be better suited for audits.” (Furubo 2011b: 77).
3.2 Methods for PA at the SNAO
To keep  a coherent process description internally, a web-based tool is used. It describes 
processes and what is expected internally from the performance auditor in each step. 
SNAO has a scientific council of external academics that evaluates the methods used for 
performance audits. There is, however, no internal method description. A process owner 
of performance audits notes that the absence of method descriptions is that  
“...we principally use the same methods for data collection and analysis that 
are generally valid for social scientific investigations. It is therefore not 
possible to say that we have a clear own methodology for performance 
audits. It has, in the light of this, been seen as a bit unnecessary to write an 
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13 Kostnadsmässiga konsekvenser, 19 § Myndigheten skall se till att de kostnadsmässiga 
konsekvenserna begränsas när den begär in uppgifter eller utövar tillsyn. (SFS 2007:515)
14 Johansson, Ylva in Aftonbladet at http://www.aftonbladet.se/debatt/debattamnen/jamstalldhet/
article14513558.ab, accessed 20.05.2012
own guide on the subject, as it would be almost like writing a “textbook” on 
methods for social scientific investigation.”15
In 2010 and 2011 a so-called cold review was undertaken, meaning that an external 
professor conducted a quality validation of the PA reports. For 2012 and 2013, a peer 
review is planned, where the international community  of state auditors is drawn upon, 
and a number of foreign SAIs will evaluate a part of the SNAO operations. Such 
reviews can bring valuable perspectives to the operations and help to keep the SNAO 
up-to-date with scientific discourse.
The social scientific stance of the SNAO underlines the similarities between 
performance audits and other social scientific research. Decisions on when certain 
methods and approaches are suitable have to be made by  the performance auditors, and 
adjusted with each performance audit prospect. 
3.3 Ethical Guidelines at the SNAO
What are the official ethics of the SNAO? Being public servants of the Swedish state, 
there is a set of general ethical guidelines: democracy, legality, objectivity, impartiality 
and equal treatment, free formation of opinions and freedom of expression, respect, 
efficiency and services (KRUS 2012: 4). These guidelines are, however, quite general, 
and lack specificity  for the auditor integrity context. From an international level, the 
membership in INTOSAI links the SNAO to the ISSAI Code of Ethics (ISSAI 30). In 
the ISSAI Code of Ethics, there are specifications about the desired behaviour for 
auditors concerning integrity, independence, objectivity, impartiality, professional 
secrecy and proficiency. However, it is noted in the ISSAI Code of Ethics that due to the 
variations of local settings, every  SAI should develop its own ethical guidelines (ISSAI 
30: 4). The code of ethics at the SNAO itself is currently  undergoing some 
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15 E-mail from PA process owner 17.04.2012, my translation of “Det beror på att vi använder oss 
av i princip samma datainsamlings- och analysmetoder som generellt gäller för 
samhällsvetenskapligt utredningsarbete. Det går därför inte att säga att vi har någon tydlig egen 
effektivitetsrevisionell metodik. Det har, mot denna bakgrund, upplevts som lite onödigt att vi 
ska skriva en egen vägledning i ämnet, det blir närmast som att skriva en ”lärobok” i 
samhällsvetenskaplig utredningsmetodik.”
development. The day-to-day, personal level of independence is presumed to be handled 
in an appropriate manner16, relying upon the auditor’s own professionalism. KRUS 
(Swedish Council for Strategic Human Resources Development) have been working 
with the SNAO since 2011, using exercises and seminars in order to create a common 
understanding of the core values. The final product is meant to be a collegial policy. 
“Since before there were three core values defined for the SNAO - openness, 
professionalism and independence. There was also a policy of ethics. But 
neither the core values nor the ethics policy had been significantly 
connected to the daily work.”17 (KRUS 2011) 
With the premises and social constructs that regulate and influence the action of 
performance auditors drawn up, it is time to turn to the main part of this study; the 
notions of performance auditors themselves.
4 Design and Method 
To understand the individual performance auditor approach, it is necessary  to look into 
where it materialises: in the interaction with auditees and other stake holders. This study 
does not seek to generalise, rather to explore the possible conflict of integrity and 
influence. This topic could be approached from many  different perspectives and levels 
of performance audit interaction, such as the auditees, or the higher levels of 
management at the SNAO. But the performance auditors are the SAI-auditee interface. 
Performance auditing is their core activity, while the auditees are only audited 
sometimes. Providing information to auditors is a task auditees are legally bound to do, 
but it  is not at the core of their work. It is therefore more interesting to investigate the 
auditor-side of the relationships if one is looking to learn about performance auditing. 
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16 E-mail from PA process owner 17.04.2012. My translation of “Vi har just nu inte några 
specifika riktlinjer för revisorers oberoende inom effektivitetsrevisionen, utan det förutsätts att 
detta sköts på ett bra sätt.”
17 My translation from “Sedan tidigare fanns tre kärnvärden definierade för Riksrevisionen – 
öppenhet, professionalism och oberoende. Man hade dessutom tagit fram en etikpolicy. Men 
vare sig kärnvärdena eller etikpolicyn hade i någon större utsträckning kopplats till det dagliga 
arbetet.”
The study  is deductive in nature, as it  starts with the theoretical contradiction between 
the two (Bryman 2011), and utilises the specific SNAO context for illuminating this 
theoretical dilemma. Multiple cases instead of a single case provide a tougher test of 
theory  (de Vaus 2001: 227). The study is thus constructed as a multiple case-study 
where PA processes along with the reports are the units of analysis. 
4.1 Case Sampling Strategy
Qualitative sampling should be guided by selecting cases that are rich in information 
and illuminate the issues central to the purpose of the research, so called purposeful 
sampling (Patton 1990). Selecting the SNAO of Sweden for a case study is a choice 
already, and could be seen as a form of extreme or deviant case sampling; the 
institutional changes that has occurred during the past couple of decades are indeed rare. 
It gives particular conditions for research about auditors’ handling of changed external 
and internal demands for their work. Theory-based or operational construct  sampling is 
when cases are selected based on a theory of a phenomenon (Patton 1990). The 
researcher samples incidents, slices of life, time periods, or people on the basis of their 
potential manifestation or representation of important theoretical constructs (ibid.). The 
sampling strategy  is intended to study the auditors’ action under the institutional and 
statutory conditions that have prevailed post-2009. 
The theoretical problem at hand is that any performance audit that involves some kind 
of interaction with the auditee also means that the SAI and the auditor needs to mitigate 
integrity, and thus independence-, risks. As seen, there is a considerable degree of 
discretion on behalf of the performance auditors in their own work, and both formative 
and summative approaches fit within the SNAO. A more formative approach, as 
opposed to summative, could mean risks to integrity  as it will involve the auditees more 
in the PA process. It seems likely  that integrity risks would be greater where there is a 
close relationship between the auditor and the auditee. 
First, to study the interaction and possible integrity risks between auditor and an 
auditee, I selected cases with a low level of complexity  in terms of few auditees. 
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Second, because I am interested in repeated relations, I selected cases where the auditee 
has some history of PA. Third, the cases needed to involve some qualitative methods. 
Fourth, to investigate the auditor approach the Government’s response is interesting 
information. Fifth, selecting different policy areas should give a wider and more 
complete image. The actual analysis refrains from grouping cases based on these 
criteria, as it could impose false structures on the material.
1) The complexity of the performance audit cases was limited to a single, or fewer than 
five, auditees. When the problems investigated are cross-sectional, the processes 
involve multiple auditees, with an accompanying Ministry. 
2) Audited body was a state agency with some history  of being performance audited. 
This was to assure organisational experience with the SNAO performance audits, and 
possibly even auditors. I made a quantitative overview of number of PA reports that one 
auditee has had between the years 2003-2011, with more than five occurrences of 
performance audit processes (see Appendix 1). The auditees that have had the most 
performance audits taking place should reasonably have “more” of a history with the 
SNAO as an organisation, and thus possibly more habit of providing data, interview 
subjects, and documents, and a more pronounced relationship with the SNAO. This 
aspect, though, should be seen as a background fact, rather than an absolute criteria for 
selection. Hence I have not excluded any reports based on this criteria, but the smallest 
amount of audit occurrences featuring in the study is five.
3) The performance audit  has been conducted involving some type of direct interaction 
between the audited body  and the auditor(s), i. e. interviews, field studies, workshops or 
similar. 
4) Governmental acceptance was one guiding criteria for the selection of the reports as 
it can be an important indicator on the relationships between the performance auditors 
and the audited organisation, as well as the performance auditors and the Government. 
Two “conflictual” cases, in terms of governmental acceptance, were selected, involving 
strong recommendations from the SNAO, and governmental resistance. One case that 
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involved fairly small recommendations and little government reaction was selected. The 
last two cases were strong in the recommendations, with a positive government 
response.
5) Five case reports were selected from different policy areas: state finance, social 
policy, labour market policy, infrastructure, integration. This to capture as wide an 
image as possible and enable maximum variation and richness of material. Lastly, I 
scrapped reports by including only those that the Government had had the time to 
respond to.
 
4.2 Data
The data collected for the selected five cases consist of primarily interviews with audit 
staff concerning both the general preconditions for PA activities as well as the particular 
case at hand. The interviews are my main data material, while other material has been 
used for control and case backgrounds necessary to make sense of the interview data. 
Complementary materials are auditee PA history operationalised as the number of PAs 
the auditee has been subject to (2003-2011), the PA report drafts and stake holder 
comments, the final PA reports, the Government’s statement (skrivelse), and the 
Parliamentary Committee and the Parliamentary  discussions in the form of debate 
protocols and policy proposals from MPs. 
A total of ten semi -structured interviews of 40 to 55 minutes have been conducted, nine 
by telephone, and one on location at  the SNAO office premises. The interviewees were 
guaranteed full anonymity, to make them feel at ease talking about “sensitive” topics 
like their own relations to the auditee, and integrity  issues. The goal was to have two 
interviews per case in order to get a higher validity in the results, as having two 
impressions of one story gives a fuller image (Bryman 2011). The interviewees were 
contacted by  e-mail and telephone. An e-mail was also sent to a press-contact at the 
SNAO, announcing the study and calling for suggestions of cases. Two of the 
suggestions received fit into the general selection criteria and these were included in the 
study. 
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The interviews have been carried out mostly with performance auditors, but also with 
project managers and one programme manager. The varying work roles should provide 
a wider perspective. Every  case study  needs to contain a time perspective (de Vaus 
2011: 227), which in this case is the entire performance audit process, publication, and 
whatever aftermath has had time to take place. The interviews were guided by the PA 
process from beginning to end. The interviewees were asked about18 their background, 
their work at the SNAO, previous experience with the auditee, personal interest  in the 
audit issue, participation and role in the work group, their perception of the word 
“auditor”, the data collection phase, the afterwork including comments from audited 
bodies19, the PA focus at the SNAO, the Government’s response and possible parliament 
treatment, as well as personal satisfaction with the results of the PA process and PA 
report. PA process and report influence were also areas of interest, to get an idea of the 
interviewee’s personal engagement in the issue. Due to the semi -structured interviews 
there was also space for unexpected topics to show up, and interviewees were 
encouraged to speak freely.
Interviews were recorded20, transcribed, and sent out for review and approval by e-mail 
to the interviewees. The changes requested were few and mainly concerned facts, some 
technical language corrections, and some touch-ups of the spoken language such as 
repetitions.
    
4.3 Analysis of Data
When interpreting the results, it  is important to keep in mind that any qualitative data 
analysis of this kind is bound to be an interpretation by the researcher (Bryman 2011). 
In turn, what the interviewees have expressed is also their interpretation. It is hence a 
question of an interpretation of several interpretations of reality. A matter of fact, they 
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18 See Appendix 2 for interview guide.
19 This data has been controlled against auditee comments in the report drafts, to make the 
case descriptions more complete. 
20 One interviewee did not agree to recording, so notes were taken during the interview and 
afterwards summarized into a narrative. The interviewee reviewed and approved of the text, 
with corrections of facts. 
could be more or less truthful. Despite the promise of anonymity, it is possible that 
some or all interviewees have tried to make certain aspects sound better than they are, 
or mask errors out of self-awareness. I have striven to handle this by partly by interview 
technique (leaving plenty of space for the interviewee, discussing themes rather than 
direct questions regarding, for instance, integrity), as well as by having two 
interviewees per case. Still, this risk remains a valid criticism against the credibility of 
this study. 
Interview data was analysed by thorough reading of the interview material, followed by 
two rounds of coding to organise and make use of the data. A risk with this kind of 
approach is that  the gathered data can be fragmented and the social context lost 
(Bryman 2011: 526). This can be problematic because in case studies, it is important to 
respect the unit of each case (de Vaus 2001: 253). The interviews have hence been 
analysed by case, to capture the meaning of the case as a whole and minimise 
fragmentation.  
The first code round had an open character in order not to impose any  categories on the 
responses, and allow for topics brought up by the respondents themselves to have a 
place in the further analysis. Hence, the themes in the first round of coding came from 
the material itself and were simply answers to the question “What are they talking 
about?”. The main purpose of the first coding round was to get an overview of the 
themes in the data material. Some of these were a direct result of the interview 
questions, and some were brought up by interviewees. Twenty-two different themes 
emerged from the first  analysis of the interviews. Not all interviewees touched upon all 
topics.
Themes that dealt with performance auditor approach were: the interviewees ‘ thoughts 
about their own role, interest in the audit topic at  hand, and how they related to the 
auditee(s), the Government, and the Parliament. These themes capture the professional 
interaction of the performance auditors. Based on the themes from the first round of 
coding, chapter 5.1 presents the auditor approach descriptively. 
32
The next step was to use a higher level of abstraction, and to explore the themes from 
the first code round using indicators that could give clues about the presence or absence 
of a contradiction between integrity  and influence. The purpose was to find out what the 
interviewees were certain about, what they expressed ambiguity about as well as how 
they  resolved ambiguous themes. I called these indicators certainty, ambiguity, and 
resolutions. Here, the reader should note that the three categories of certainty, ambiguity 
and resolutions are not predetermined to be about auditor approach or roles, but that 
they  all have the possibility to fit any theme that came up during the first coding round. 
This width of interpretation has been kept to avoid imposing categories on the data, and 
to avoid missing out on unexpected results from the study. The results of the second 
round are presented in chapter 5.2.   
5 Analysis of Case Data
In this section the results of the case-studies are presented. The disposition is guided by 
the two themes for the research questions; auditor approach, and the more overarching 
aspect of the complexity  of being both evaluator and auditor. First, I present the cases 
according to some basic descriptors for the reader to get an overview of the material. I 
have considered the PA approach as summative or formative based on how much of the 
PA was concerned with summative goal-rationality dominated evaluation, or formative 
operations-rational evaluations (Johansson 2006: 43). Elements of knowledge 
development are considered formative, and audits that primarily consist of a review and 
evaluation of interventions as summative. Clearly, an auditor is formally  an auditor, 
with all the rights and obligations that that means, and the two types of summative and 
formative are ideal types. The purpose here is to give the reader an idea of what 
approach was more prominent in the cases. 
CASE A
Auditees Multiple (3)
Issue-area Social Security
33
CASE A
Summative or 
formative 
approach
Summative and formative
Description The issue area was described as entirely new and “troublesome”, as 
it involved several auditees due to the responsibility and 
accountability division between various levels of authorities on the 
matter. Involving vulnerable groups of society, it was perceived of 
as “very close” to many. Interest for it was widespread beyond the 
Government and Parliament among citizens and interest groups. 
Auditeeʼs 
response
The auditees were aware of the issues and mostly agreed with the 
conclusions of the SNAO.
Governmentʼs 
response
The Government received the report with quite a positive response. 
One of the recommendations they agreed to implement, while the 
other one they dismissed referring to policy interventions that did 
not yet have the time to show in any research data. 
Parliamentʼs 
response
Here, it seems the Parliamentary situation overruled the 
Government’s statement. Once the Parliamentary Committee had 
prepared the issue, two policy propositions had been raised from 
MPs, regarding the necessity to implement also the second 
recommendation of the SNAO. Before it came to a vote, the 
Government had already agreed to implement the second 
recommendation.
CASE B
Auditees Single
Issue-area Labour Market Policy
Summative or 
formative 
approach
Summative
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CASE B
Description The issue was during pre-studies believed to be more pertinent than 
it turned out to be. Definition difficulties gave the auditors an 
impression that the problem was larger than it was. The auditors 
perceived of this as a good example of a report where there was not 
so much need for action, and that the report had more of a 
“scanning” quality of an area where there was not so much 
previous knowledge. 
Auditeeʼs 
response
While the effects were limited on a governmental level, the auditee 
agreed to certain measures for improvement on the problem area. 
Governmentʼs 
response
There were two recommendations from the SNAO, and they were 
handled in a way that an interviewee describes as “reasonable”; no 
big fuss for a small issue, that in addition seemed to concern a 
heterogeneous group, as was mentioned by a different research 
institute. 
Parliamentʼs 
response
There was no parliamentary attention raised as a result of the 
report. 
CASE C
Auditees Multiple (2)
Issue-area State finance
Summative or 
formative 
approach
Summative
35
CASE C
Description The purpose was to find out whether the Government had acted 
according to the stipulated goals in the creation and management of 
a fund as part of a legal framework for tackling financial crisis 
situations. There were two parts to the report, one where the SNAO 
criticized how the fund was built up, stating that it was not very 
purposeful to meeting the goals that were stated in the proposition 
for the creation of the fund. The second part concerned the legality 
of a transfer made to the fund by the state. Quite controversially, 
the result was that the Government had not acted entirely in 
accordance with the law in their management of the funds. The 
report contains plenty of economic terms, and one auditor 
expressed concern that the Parliament might have difficulties 
understanding it.
Governmentʼs
/Auditeesʼs 
response
In this case, the auditee was a Ministry. The Ministry did not agree 
that the transfer was in a legal gray - zone, but they “kept doors 
open” for modifying the structure of the framework. There was also 
referral to an own undergoing investigation of the Government.
Parliamentʼs 
response
There were two propositions raised as a result of the report 
presentation at the Parliament, both following in the lines of the 
SNAO.
CASE D
Auditees Single
Issue-area Infrastructure
Summative or 
formative 
approach
Summative and formative
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CASE D
Description This report addressed a lack of methods for measuring efficiency. It 
has both a summative and a formative element, where first the 
absence of a method was pointed out, and as the process went on, a 
method was developed. The study involved close contacts between 
the auditors and the auditee on many levels of the auditee 
organisation, from leadership to operational level. 
Auditeeʼs 
response
There were mixed responses: the leadership was initially negative 
and then again disagreed with the conclusions and 
recommendations when the report was published. Within the 
audited organisation, however, the audit reverberated and even 
generated new positions with the sole purpose of method 
development.
Governmentʼs 
response
On a governmental level, the conclusions were dismissed to some 
degree, the Government referring to upcoming own investigations 
of methods. 
Parliamentʼs 
response
There were a couple of propositions raised in the Parliament as a 
result, however these were not approved of as the Parliamentary 
Committee considered the already taken measures on auditee and 
government level were sufficient to handle the problem.
CASE E
Auditees Multiple (4)
Issue-area Integration
Summative or 
formative 
approach
Summative
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CASE E
Description This PA investigated the interventions of a number of actors that 
are responsible for the labour market integration and higher 
education validation of immigrants. Using file studies and 
alternative calculation scenarios the SNAO was able to show that 
the handling of this policy problem had not been sufficiently 
effective and purposeful. The main recommendations were about 
the Government steering more clearly. 
Auditeeʼs 
response
The auditees were positive to the investigation as it was a heartfelt 
topic and a problem important for society to resolve.
Governmentʼs 
response
The Government agreed with most things and planned to take 
actions.
Parliamentʼs 
response
There was one statement from one party, other than that there was 
no debate as a result of the report.
To sum up, three of the reports can be seen as primarily  summative, with the main focus 
being a review of a certain policy intervention, or lack thereof, and the 
recommendations primarily are about the Government steering better. Two reports can 
be seen as having both summative and formative elements, where there is first a review 
of what has not  been done, or not done well enough, followed by concrete suggestions 
for policy interventions that could improve the situation. 
Auditors have expressed general satisfaction with the influence of the reports. This was 
a surprising result, as one can easily  get a bleak image of the Government’s response 
from reading the skrivelser on certain reports. As it turned out, many reports had 
indirect effects and could spark parliamentary debate on a topic, public interest in an 
issue, or be used as information basis for further investigations, not seldom undertaken 
by the Government. One interviewee expressed the perception of a “competition” 
between the Government’s own investigations and the SNAO at times. It appears the 
Government frequently addresses issues with own research committees, something that 
leaves an SNAO report “hanging”, as usually  decisions are not made until the 
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Government’s own committee has looked at a topic. The timing of reports to be 
published was important here, at the same time as the SNAO has their own internal 
productivity demands to keep up with. 
5.1 Auditor Approach
Below is a descriptive account of the performance auditors’ perceptions and how they 
relate to the PA process and report, the auditee(s), the Government and the Parliament. 
To maintain the anonymity  of the interviewees, this section will not be tied to any 
particular case. The interviewed persons had been active at the SNAO from 2,5 to 9 
years.21 A couple of interviewees had been recruited to the SNAO, either as consultants, 
or as permanent employees due to particular skills that were needed for particular 
projects. Economy and political science were common educational backgrounds. Most 
did not refer to themselves as “auditors”, or use the term as a description of their work- 
not even those working with highly quantitative methods. Some agreed to calling 
themselves “performance auditors”, while others still preferred to name themselves 
“investigators” or “evaluators”. 
 
Assignment of projects is handled by unit managers that are the level above the program 
managers. Previous experience with audited subject area seems to steer who gets what 
project, although there are possibilities for the auditors to express desires about what 
issue-areas they wish to work with, and what areas not. Generally  project groups are 
assembled to include both qualitative and quantitative auditors, reflecting the mixed 
methods that  are used in nearly  every performance audit at the SNAO. Practically  in the 
project groups, though, there is an amount of cross-over work between auditors working 
with primarily quantitative versus qualitative areas; particularly  if the project group is 
small. This manifested primarily in persons with a quantitative research focus 
undertaking also qualitative research moments, like conducting interviews. The PA 
reports are created in project groups of two to five persons, including a project manager 
leading the PA. The project groups are parts of one audit strategy, that is lead by  a 
program manager that has an overarching responsibility. The hierarchy of the project 
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21 Some even longer, but here I have decided to draw a line at the start-up of the Swedish 
National Audit Office, 2003, thus the longest possible time is nine years.
groups is rather flat, “...the usual is to work in pairs or three persons, and then one does 
all kinds of work by oneself”, as one project manager describes the work division. 
Ultimately the Auditor General is responsible for the conclusions of the audit report. 
The relations to higher management appear to be relaxed, but also not always very 
frequent. This is understandable considering the size of the organisation; some 300 
employees and three Auditors General. One interviewee expresses that the Auditors 
General are “very  involved” in the operations of the SNAO, “meddling” a lot more than 
directors of other authorities. Sometimes there was slight irritation over the Auditor 
General’s decisions regarding textual formulations in the reports and press statements, 
however this came with a sense of understanding, as the Auditor Generals are the ones 
accountable for the report.
“I think our role here is very free, I worked with A that you have also talked 
to, and I think we have plenty of liberty. Not until it gets to the highest level, 
it is mostly then that viewpoints and opinions appear more clearly. It is the 
Auditors General who at the end have to take responsibility for the 
product.”22
 
There is clearly a high esteem for the professionalism of the performance auditors at the 
SNAO, with a high degree freedom for the performance auditors to shape and influence 
their own projects, methods, interaction and conclusions. The interviewees appeared to 
appreciate the high-confidence work mode.  
5.1.1 Relating to the Performance Audits
 
Many interviewees expressed, upon asking, that they felt  a personal engagement about 
the issue under investigation. This is an aspect subject to large variations though. The 
formal follow-up for the yearly  SNAO report is the responsibility of the project 
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22 “Jag tycker det är en jättefri roll här, jag jobbade ju med X som du har pratat med, och jag 
tycker vi har stora frihetsgrader. Det är först när man kommer upp på högsta nivå, det är först 
då som det kommer synpunkter och åsikter mer ordentligt. Det är ju Riksrevisorerna som i 
slutändan ska ta ansvar för produkten.” 
managers. It appears from the results that the more “social” a topic is, affecting, for 
instance, the life of families, the larger was the interest in the issue of the performance 
auditor. Here, it is also necessary to note that this was not the only  factor that seemed to 
matter, but also the magnitude of the problem and the resulting performance audit 
result. The term “blockbuster”23 was sometimes used to benchmark the influence of the 
report, although mostly to describe how reports were not really blockbusters, rather than 
expressing that they were: 
“Even if this one wasn’t really a blockbuster...”24
“Then there was some report too that came in 2006 that was a real 
blockbuster that created some turmoil I think, when it was a little bit to and 
fro and, well...I think they weren’t entirely happy then.”25
“This material is difficult to interpret, so to speak, it probably won’t be any 
blockbuster in that way...”26
While one auditor had conducted an own follow-up of a recommendation, like calling 
involved parties after publishing, partly due to a strong public interest, others kept 
reading up on the issue whenever they heard anything about it in the academic world or 
in the media. Other auditors merely  sporadically followed the internal press coverage. It 
is likely that if an auditor works repeatedly within the same PA-strategy, he or she will 
be in frequent contact with similar issue-areas, such as finance, social policy, or 
infrastructure. Also, frequently the suggestions for investigations come from the 
auditors themselves: they come up with suggestions for PA-topics, that are then 
approved by the Auditor-Generals (Auditors General). If a person has “spotted” the 
topic, it is likely that they are also more passionate about it. The reasons for being 
interested in the follow-up sometimes came from pure curiosity to find out “what had 
41
23 “Kioskvältare”
24 “Även om den var ingen kioskvältare den här...”
25 “Då var det väl någon rapport också som kom 2006 som vart en riktig kioskvältare som 
skapade rabalder tror jag, när det blev lite hit och dit och, ja...de var väl inte helt nöjda då, tror 
jag.”
26 “Det är ju lite svårtolkad materia så att säga, det blir nog ingen kioskvältare på det sättet...”
happened”, but  was also described to be a result  of the task and mandate that the SNAO 
has, and often as a combination of both: 
“Sure, I, as most people who work here, feel an engagement for the task. 
Not only because it is personally fun working with finding out how things 
really are, but I have a social engagement too. And, yes, I think that is valid 
for most people working here, that they consider our task important. And we 
have an amazing mandate to take on this task. It is a strong mandate, an 
independence protected by the constitution, I think it is fair to say that 
compared to corresponding authorities in other states, the SNAO has a very 
strong mandate, a very strong independence. And that makes it exciting to 
work. So there is a personal engagement, too.”27
It is clear from the quote above that esteem and pride in the own Supreme Audit 
Institution are important motivators for an engaged approach to the task and the public 
ethos. Some auditors referred to “the taxpayers” and /or the “taxpayer’s interest” as a 
prime motivation for taking pride in their work. These statements could be interpreted 
as a strong public ethos.
“So one has to find a way of also trying to make the administrative authority 
understand that it is about utilising our tax money in an effective way 
together...”28
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27 “Visst, jag, som liksom de flesta som jobbar här, känner ett engagemang för uppgiften. Inte 
bara att det är personligt kul att jobba med att ta reda på hur saker och ting egentligen är utan 
jag har ett samhälleligt engagemang, också. Och att, ja, jag tror det gäller för de flesta som 
jobbar här att de tycker att det är en viktig uppgift vi har. Och vi har ju ett fantastiskt mandat att 
utföra den uppgiften. Det är ett starkt mandat, ett grundlagsskyddat oberoende, jag tror man 
kan säga att om man jämför svenska Riksrevisionen med motsvarande myndigheter i de flesta 
andra länder så har den svenska Riksrevisionen ett mycket starkt mandat, ett mycket starkt 
oberoende. Och, det gör det spännande att arbeta med vår verksamhet. Så det finns ett 
personligt engagemang också.”
28 “Så att det gäller att hitta ett sätt att också försöka få myndigheten att förstå att det handlar 
om att tillsammans använda våra skattepengar på ett effektivt sätt...”
“...and as I’ve worked at the Ministry and have that kind of culture in my 
body, that we should cherish the taxpayers’ money...”29  
“...if we think there isn’t anything to do, then one might, as a taxpayer, think 
that we are busying ourselves with the wrong things.”30
“...not the most optimal way...from the perspective of the taxpayers.”31
Overall, the interviewees were content with the influence that occurred as a direct or 
indirect consequence of the PA process and reports. As long as “the work got done”, the 
performance auditors appeared to care less about who took on to consider the changes; 
the Government, the Parliament, or the auditee level. At times, the auditee level 
response is sufficient for the Parliament or Government not to push an issue, trusting the 
auditee to handle it. In those cases, the PA process had a very  direct effect in starting to 
stir thoughts at the audited unit even before final publication of the report. In cases of 
audits where there was a formative element, sometimes the performance auditors were 
involved with the auditee for knowledge transfer -like interaction posterior to the 
publication of the report:
“But well I think one could say that it is that very work that they started 
there, and A has after this project participated in many meetings in the 
group, we are really not supposed to work as consultants, but it is 
considered more of a follow-up in the case of this report, that A has been in 
the meetings this group working with these development issues have 
arranged at the AO. That, I think, is what one sees, the effects of it all I 
think.”32
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29 “...och jag har ju jobbat på departementet och har en sådan kultur i kroppen att vi ska värna 
om skattebetalarnas pengar”
30 “...om vi inte tror att det finns något att göra, för då kan man, då kanske man som 
skattebetalare tycker att vi håller på med fel saker...”
31 “...inte det mest optimala sättet...från skattebetalarnas perspektiv”
32 “Men alltså jag tror att man kan säga att det är just det arbetet som de har satt igång där, och 
A har ju varit med efter det här projektet på många möten i den grupp, vi ska ju egentligen inte 
jobba då som konsulter, men det ses mer som ett uppföljningsarbete i den rapporten då, att A 
har varit med i möten som den här gruppen som jobbar med de här utvecklingsfrågorna har 
ordnat på GO. Det tror jag att det är det man ser, effekterna av det hela tror jag.”
5.1.2 Relating to the Auditee
Most often, relationships between auditor and auditee consisted of previous 
performance audit experience with the auditee. It  was not unusual to have some 
background with the current auditee, either having worked for the state before the 
SNAO, and sometimes even having worked at the audited entity. There were also a 
couple of cases where the auditees were entirely new to project managers and group 
members. Previous experience at the auditee was not seen as an issue, but rather an 
advantage. “Internal” knowledge of an auditee facilitates entrances for the auditors 
when it comes to contact persons at the auditee, as well as familiarity with “ways of 
work” at the auditees and internal culture. On the topic of independence and integrity, 
some interviewees were very  relaxed, while others appeared more unsure about the 
topic, yet others were eager to state very clearly that independence and integrity were 
not issues for them:
“....I do not experience that I have any insufficient support in any way...(...). 
I think I...at least I feel it is pretty clear what is expected from me.(...) But I 
do not think that there are any problems with my independence.”33 
It was, fairly surprising considering the context, rare for interviewees to express any 
personal familiarities with the auditees, although several interviewees referred to having 
worked repeatedly with the same contact persons at  the authorities, and generally 
knowing people around the administration:   
“The same people move around in this sphere (the state, author’s note). (...) 
It’s the same people coming and going. Sometimes they show up in one 
place, and then they’re in the next.”34
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33 “...jag anser inte att jag har otillräckligt stöd på något sätt...(...). Jag tror jag...jag känner 
åtminstone att det är ganska tydligt vad som förväntas av mig. (...) Men jag tycker inte att det är 
något problem med mitt oberoende.”
34 “Jamen det är samma människor som rör sig i den här sfären. (...) Det är samma människor 
som kommer och går. Ibland så dyker de upp på det ena stället och sedan är de på nästa 
ställe.”
Auditor-auditee relations were overall described as collaborative. Initial contacts are 
made with, if not the General Director at the auditee, then some other high-level 
manager. During the data collection phase and sometimes after a finished audit, there 
are always contacts between auditors and administrators, and other employees on 
different levels. 
In some cases it  was possible to discern a variation between different levels of an 
organisation when it came to how the audit was received. Leadership was at times more 
defensive and negative towards the audit, than lower levels of employees. This is logical 
from an accountability  perspective where leadership has a greater responsibility for 
organisation-wide practises than workers; leadership has more reason to perceive 
pointing out lacks in the policy implementation as criticism of their work, and this also 
shows in some negative or suspicious reactions to the initiation of performance audits. 
Some interviewees pointed out that problems are most often known within an 
organisation, and the arrival of the SNAO performance auditors can be perceived of as a 
chance to “lift” and voice an issue that has not  been prioritised by the Government or 
leadership, employees wanting to “...tell their story”. This might be a further 
explanation to why lower levels of an organisation would be more positive towards the 
SNAO, than the leadership; that they get to perceive of effectiveness problems in a 
much more hands-on way, than the leadership. Interviewees underlined the rationality of 
the auditees, except from when the auditee was the Government. Experts in their own 
areas, hands-on experience with effectiveness problems and unclear governmental 
steering, the auditees were described as “pragmatic”: 
“Well first of all the authorities are very pragmatic and they understand, I 
mean, if we come to them and tell them ‘we found these problems, what is 
your take on these?’  they usually know of these problems already, it rarely 
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comes as a surprise, I think they were content that we came from the SNAO 
and that we also raised this issue”35
For the audited organisation, it  seems that the SNAO performance auditors can be 
perceived in different ways. The SNAO is always a familiar institution and it may come 
with familiar persons. Familiarity can serve as an enhancer for collaboration, but it 
should as well reasonably generate larger role - and integrity conflicts for the auditors. 
Certain issues or groups can be empowered and lifted by the PAs; this also reflects the 
democracy  aspect of the selection criteria for PA at the SNAO as mentioned previously. 
Auditees generally provided plentiful feedback during facts-review rounds, and the 
performance auditors all expressed that these were very  valuable for the quality of the 
report. Except for pure fact  errors and clarifications, the project groups also considered 
requests for changes of wording. For instance, somebody not wanting to feature in the 
report with their name or title, or outright  withdrawals of statements, or requests for 
amendments. Here, the auditors tried to go as easy  as possible on identifiable persons, 
but they  were also clear regarding their right to hold on to their conclusions, despite 
somebody considering their work “under attack ”. 36 
5.1.3 Relating to the Government and Parliament
Relations to the Government and Parliament appear to have moved in positive 
directions after the changes of 2003, 2009 and 2011. The SNAO no longer being 
dependent on the Government for its mandate, the opinions of Ministries or singular 
persons of the Government do not  appear to affect the conclusions and 
recommendations of the performance auditors much. The Parliament and its various 
Committees appear to appreciate the work of the SNAO.
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35 “Alltså myndigheterna först och främst är ju väldigt pragmatiska och de förstår ju, alltså, om 
det är så att vi kommer till dem och säger "vi har hittat de här problemen, hur ställer ni er till 
dem" så oftast känner de ju redan till problemen, det kommer ju sällan som en överraskning, jag 
tror de tyckte att det var skönt att vi kom från Riksrevisionen och att även vi lyfte upp 
problemet.”
36 The comments from fact-review rounds have been read through but not systematically 
categorized. Referrals to comments in the interviews have been checked against the actual 
report drafts for corroboration.
“...my experience is that it is considerably easier collaborating with the 
administration, we rarely have problems, on the other hand the relations are 
a bit frosty on a Ministerial level, it can often get a bit tense and there can 
be certain hang-ups so there one has to try extra hard to, well, soften them 
up, perhaps they feel more directly affected by what we audit (...)”37
Fairly  surprising, the relations with the Government and the Ministries appeared more 
static and less collaborative than with the auditees. Related to criticising the 
Government’s actions on a matter, an interviewee expressed an expectation that the 
Government would not yield: 
“But otherwise I’m not surprised that when it comes to the handling of B, 
that the Government doesn’t, so to say, roll over and say “we made a 
mistake (...)”, I think that is too much to ask, ehm, in that case it is obvious 
that they will defend their position and their actions, but that doesn’t make it 
more right, rather on the contrary...”38
“The Government pretends nothing has happened, I can consider that 
endearing (...)”39
There was, however, surprisingly  few expressions of prestige vis-à-vis the Government. 
All the interviewees expressed firmness in their conclusions and recommendations in 
the reports, and frequently noted that the Government did not always agree about 
matters. They were rarely surprised about this fact, but there was little or no indications 
in the material of concerns for the Government’s opinions, be it dismissal or approval.
47
37 “...min upplevelse är att det är betydligt enklare att samarbeta med myndigheterna, det är 
sällan som vi har problem, däremot så är det lite frostiga relationer på departementsnivå, det 
kan ofta bli lite stelt och det kan vara vissa låsningar så där får man jobba lite extra med att 
försöka, ja, mjuka upp dem, de kanske känner sig mer direkt berörda av det vi granskar (...).”
38 “Men sen så är jag inte förvånad när det gäller hanteringen av B, att regeringen inte, så att 
säga, lägger sig på rygg och säger att "vi gjorde fel (...)", det tror jag är lite för mycket begärt, 
utan, där är det väl självklart att de tänker försvara sin hållning och sitt handlingssätt, men det, 
gör det inte mer rätt, utan snarare tvärtom...”
39 “Regeringen låtsas som att det regnar, det kan man tycka är charmigt (...)”
As for parliamentary relations, these appear to have changed to be more interactive with 
the new tabling process. One auditor expressed that the direct tabling process could 
have the effect of auditors being more careful throughout the process, as they know 
everything goes to the Parliament, 
“...one can’t bother them with just anything. Before there was this sifting 
function there that, like I said; it simply feels more transparent. More 
natural.”40. 
“...previously we had this strange construct with a Board, nobody thought 
that it was very good to have it. And I mean I can only speak for my area 
here, the Parliamentary Committee has displayed a significant interest for 
it, before I don’t think that (the report) always came to the Committee, but 
was presented to our Board, but perhaps that didn’t feel quite as 
meaningful...”41
It seems closer collaboration with the principal (the Parliament) has the possible effect 
of adding more meaning to the work of the performance auditors, as well as pushing for 
higher quality. The independence of the SNAO could be under some threat, also from its 
own principal, but the institutional relations should make sure that this does not happen. 
Overseeing the SNAO is not assigned to any particular group of the Parliament, as it is 
in many other countries, and there is thus no one strong group to exert influence over 
the SNAO. It is therefore unlikely  that it would be subject to undue influence from the 
Parliament. 
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40 “...kan man inte besvära med vad som helst. Tidigare fanns det den här sållningsfuktionen 
där då som, nja, som sagt det känns mer transparent, helt enkelt. Naturligare.”
41 “...tidigare hade vi ju den här konstiga konstruktionen med en styrelse, det tyckte ju ingen var 
bra. Och jag menar jag kan ju bara tala för mitt område här, det har ju hela tiden varit ett väldigt 
intresse från utskottets sida, tidigare tror jag inte att det var så att man alltid kom till utskottet, 
utan då var de ju dragna i vår styrelse, men det kändes ju kanske inte riktigt lika meningsfullt...”
5.2 Role Perception Indicators: Certainty, Ambiguity and Resolutions 
In this section, I have increased the level of abstraction from the first coding round, and 
collected themes in three categories that can illuminate the second research question: 
certainty, ambiguity and resolutions. Using these three abstracts, I have sifted through 
the data material from the first round. As the interview data comes from ten different 
individuals, the categories will not be mutually  exclusive in the below presentation. 
There can also be reasons why the same person would say that, for instance, the SNAO 
direction for PA both creates ambiguity and provides resolutions to a problem. The 
normative judgement here would be to say that certainty is desirable and ambiguity is 
less desirable, however one should keep in mind that ambiguity  is necessary  for norms 
and concepts to develop as time passes. If no ambiguity was ever pronounced, the 
chances of improving conditions would also be lower. No ambiguity - no resolution.
5.2.1 Certainty
Under this code statements that were descriptions or explanations containing 
expressions of certainty  and firmness have been collected. There was certainty 
expressed in aspects relating to the professional role of the interviewees, including 
auditors’ descriptions of their experience and education, their methods, in realising their 
own professional limits42, their place in the organisation, in relations to their managers 
and the Auditors General. This implies that there is a strong professionalism among the 
performance auditors, and quite clear professional roles. The esteem in their own 
organisation was also an area where there were many affirmative statements, expressing 
thoughts about the SNAO unique mandate and independence. While most auditors had a 
strong belief in the SNAO mandate and independence, there was also an awareness of 
drawing a line for how far the responsibility of the SNAO goes, and what influence 
possibilities that the SNAO has. Interviewees were firm when talking about the 
recommendations made and sticking to these during facts-review rounds. Holding on to 
a conclusion and thereon based recommendations despite complaints from somebody 
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42 For instance, when an external professional is needed for a performance audit. 
that one has seen frequently in the past months, and likely will see again within the 
same PA strategy, fits Lundquist’s (1998) definition of moral courage and integrity.
Certainty  also appeared when discussing the purpose and goal of conducting 
performance audits. The new facilitating direction requested by  the Parliamentary 
Review seems to be well-grounded among the performance auditors. Not every auditor 
expressed certainty about all of these points, but they  were all featured themes. Next, I 
turn to look at the areas where the auditors expressed ambiguity or role conflicts.
 
5.2.2 Ambiguity
The theme of ambiguity can be interpreted in several ways. The aim has been not to 
enforce an interpretation where I have expected there might be ambiguity, but rather I 
have looked for themes in which the auditors themselves have expressed ambiguity. 
This has not always been very outspoken. I have paid attention to contradictions within 
an interview, as well as expressions such as “somehow”, “even though we are...”, “we 
could be...”. The below quote makes a good example: 
“...and then we conduct audits from a facilitating perspective, so that we 
also somehow, even though we are independent auditors, can help the 
authorities finding solutions to matters that need improvement and together 
with them be able to point out ‘this is one way to do it’, reason around it, 
there are different attitudes to this here in the house, how one sees this, but I 
think it is very important to contribute with bringing out things that are 
positive and good examples and not just come with criticism all the time 
because then, sometimes it is like flogging a dead horse...”43
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43 “...och sen så gör vi granskningar utifrån ett främjande perspektiv, så att vi ska också på 
något sätt, även om vi är oberoende granskare också hjälpa myndigheterna att hitta lösningar 
på saker som behöver förbättras och tillsammans med myndigheterna kunna peka på "såhär 
skulle man kunna göra", resonera kring det, det finns lite olika inställningar kring det här här i 
huset, hur man ser på det där, men jag tycker det är väldigt viktigt att man också kan bidra med 
att lyfta fram sådant som är bra och goda exempel och inte bara komma med kritik hela tiden 
därför att då, det är ibland som att slå in öppna dörrar...” 
Ambiguity was expressed when discussing the formal titles versus the actual work 
tasks, as seen from the above description of how the performance auditors saw their 
title, compared to what they really do. Distribution of personal working time was 
sometimes an issue if there was a demanding performance audit situation requiring a lot 
of after-work. The selection of audit topics and new topics of audit were reasons for 
uncertainty as some issue-areas are difficult  to translate into quantifiable data, and 
would require new methods. New areas of audits also rendered some questions with 
regards to the multi-level nature of administration on the area. The SNAO is a state 
audit agency, not an auditor of municipalities and counties. Some problem areas, like 
public health, reach over the entire span of administration from national to local, and are 
more problematic for the SNAO. A singular PA is nearly never focused on all of the 
three Es, therefore these do not create role conflicts. 
During the main study phase of the PAs, the ambiguity  expressed was regarding 
familiarity  with the representatives at the auditee, the ethical guidelines (or lack 
thereof), and the nature of the collaboration with the auditee. These are all connected to 
the ethos of the auditors. However there were very few statements that directly 
expressed uncertainty  regarding this, and most auditors when asked, did not perceive of 
the guidelines as insufficient. 
When it comes to publishing and post-processing, there was some ambiguity regarding 
what was the best way of doing this. While recognising the media-effect a descriptive 
statistic in a press statement can have, it was also recognised that such a statement could 
lead to an over-simplified interpretation of the topic in the media. Auditors often had 
low expectancies of the possible consequences of the audit, but were satisfied generally 
with what they resulted in, directly or indirectly. Since the relations to the auditees were 
generally  more favourable, there appeared to be a greater mutual understanding than 
between the SNAO and the Ministries. This difference in relations and structures 
affected the ways that the auditors thought they could be influential in; the auditees 
were clearly seen as more possible to reason with, while the Government would 
frequently have a bland reaction to the audit results and be unwilling to give the SNAO 
direct recognition, even though they would later on use the results. This was accepted 
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among the auditees and not perceived to be a problem to their work. Last but not least, 
the purpose and goal of conducting PAs was subject  to quite wide definitions including 
both summative and formative elements. This reflects the complex nature of 
performance audits, and the inherent role conflict that is the focus of this study. 
The certainty and ambiguity categories taken together, one notices that there appears to 
be a perception of certainty around organisational -level factors like independence, 
mandate, and possibilities of influence, while the individual -level factors give space for 
more ambiguity. The auditors generally did not express feeling confusion about their 
own role, but it seemed, at times, that the auditees did not know what to expect. A 
defensive attitude towards the initiation of a PA signals suspicion and expectations of a 
“summative fault-finder”, while the auditors time after time underline the facilitating 
role that they have. When there was previous personal experiences between auditee and 
auditor from other contexts than the audit situation, the auditee was confused about the 
auditor’s role. The purpose and goal of conducting PAs was a theme that featured in 
both certain and ambiguous statements. This does not necessarily mean that the 
interviewees are sometimes not certain about why they are doing what they do, but 
rather seems to reflect the wide scope and span of possibilities for PA.
5.2.3 Resolutions
In this last part  of the analysis, I have analysed the transcripts for anything that might be 
considered a resolution to an ambiguity. This final factor gets to illuminate the question 
of how performance auditors handle ambiguity  in their professional role. Actions, 
structures, persons, and outright tools can all be part of this section. Summarised, the 
topics that caused ambiguity  in the interviews were: titles, distribution of personal work 
time, audit objects and the handling of new issues, auditor-auditee relations on a 
personal level, how to maximise the influence of the recommendations vis-à-vis the 
Government and the auditee, and the purpose and goals of PA activities.
The professional titles, while not always entirely accurate, were not something that 
appeared to need any direct solution from the side of the interviewees. Difficulties 
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regarding distribution of personal work time were not very common, and were solved 
when they occurred by  flexibility on behalf of the SNAO, budgeting also for post-
processing of an issue. New audit areas and difficulties arising with them were also 
handled on an organisational level, although it appears some policy-areas are beyond 
the reach of the SNAO due to them not being easily quantifiable. 
Ambiguity arising from relations with the auditee on an individual level was solved 
primarily  by lifting up the issues to a collective level. The project group is the most 
prominent theme that comes up under this topic. A new employee gets socialised into 
the common ethical norms and behaviours by being part of a project group, under more 
experienced supervision. It is to the project group that an auditor first  turns, should there 
be any issues; it appears that the reports are clearly the results of group efforts: 
“...this is something that is alive for us all the time, how to relate (to the 
auditee), so we often have discussions about it. Quite soon after one gets 
here, well, if one isn’t already aware, one realises the special place that one 
is in, that it is very important not to run anybody’s errands (...)”.44
 
The collective form of working and the flat team-structure thus appears to be the most 
important safety-net for role ambiguity related to integrity, not formal ethical guidelines. 
Ambiguity on behalf of the auditees’ side towards the audit was handled by striving to 
make the process as clear and transparent as possible, and making data collection easier 
for the auditee by actively entering the audited organisation on different levels, 
collecting data. There has been no evidence in the data to support a manifestation of 
retraction from an auditee or an audit area due do expressions of discomfort, but there 
has been evidence that the performance auditors actively look to put the auditees at ease 
with the audit and create a professional understanding for why the audit is taking place. 
Entering into the PA process with a respectful, to-the-point, knowledgeable approach 
were also mentioned as important for building good relations with the auditee.
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44 “...det här är någonting som är levande för oss hela tiden, hur man ska förhålla sig, så har vi 
ju ofta diskussioner om det. Ganska snart efter det att man kommer hit så, om man inte redan 
är medveten om det, så förstår man ju att man sitter i en ganska speciell sits, att det är väldigt 
viktigt liksom att man inte ska gå någons ärenden,(...)”. 
“...all those things they (the project group) handled very smoothly, and in 
that way created a trust from the auditee(s), and that is in no way 
contradictive to our possibility to take a critical stance to the operations. 
But it was an important thing.(...) But it is also about doing them justice in 
the report, and I think that also contributes to a positive reception of it and 
that our recommendations are taken care of and implemented, too.” 45
Interviewees solved their ambiguity  problems with how to report findings by adjusting 
the language of the reports to be sufficiently  clear, while being bureaucratic and humble 
enough, often done with the aid of the internal quality assurance that checks the report 
along the process and works as a support for the performance auditors’ work; the quality 
assurance is internal to the SNAO while being external to the project group, and can 
contribute with valuable points of view. Following the same line of balancing the 
SNAO-auditee relations, the facts-review rounds where auditee comments and opinions 
are collected were considered useful for putting auditees more at ease with the results to 
come: 
“It is a way of making the whole thing less dramatic, I mean they (drafts) 
are nothing that may leak out and become public before the report is ready, 
but at the same time, well, they get to see our ready analysis beforehand and 
there can be a psychological effect in it, that it makes them feel safer.”46
On a personal level, some interviewees expressed understanding for poor policy 
decisions being made under stress, or other coping problems within the administrative 
authority. Having an understanding for the conditions under which a decision has been 
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45 ”...alla sådana där saker så att de skötte det väldigt snyggt, och det byggde på det viset 
förtroende, ifrån de granskade myndigheterna, och det är inte på något sätt oförenligt med att vi 
sedan kan vara kritiska till verksamheten. Men det var ju en viktig sak.(...) Men det gäller ju att 
vi gör dem rättvisa i rapporten, och det tror jag också bidrar till ett positivt mottagande av 
rapporten och att våra rekommendationer blir omhändertagna och utförda också.”
46 “Det är ett sätt att avdramatisera det hela, jag menar det är ingenting som får läckas ut och bli 
offentligt innan rapporten är klar men samtidigt så, de får ju se vår färdiga analys i förväg och 
det kan finnas en psykologisk effekt i det, att de känner sig tryggare i det.”
made can make it easier to relate to and respect the audited entity and can be seen as a 
personal coping strategy on behalf of the auditors.
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6 Conclusions
Research question 1: How do performance auditors perceive of their own role? Are 
there any role conflicts?
The performance auditors generally perceived of their own role as unproblematic. There 
was clearly outspoken professional identities. Many statements from the interviews 
could be related to the parliamentary direction of a formative approach, even in the most 
summative cases. The personal commitment to the issue at hand varied, but the 
underlying logic for commitment appeared to be the magnitude of the issue, the public 
interest in the matter, and the appropriate allocation of taxpayers’ money. There were 
few expressions of prestige vis-á-vis the Government and the Ministries, on the 
contrary, there were many expressions of understanding when it came to mistakes. 
Performance auditors were also aware of their own role being seen as fault-finding, and 
expecting negative reactions.
While the auditors themselves rarely  experienced role conflicts, the auditees at times 
seemed more prone to take a defensive stance towards the auditors, especially 
leadership levels of the audited organisations. On a “ground-level”, there were different 
attitudes perceived as problems are usually  known by staff, and performance audits can 
have the function of lifting issues and bringing attention to already known problems in 
an organisation. Performance audits can thus have an empowering function for public 
sector employees. Performance auditors went through some trouble to maintain a 
neutral stance and to show the auditees that they were not looking to “bust” anybody  or 
attack the work of the auditees, in order to get better collaboration from the audited 
organisations. Another role conflict that appeared in the study was when an auditor had 
recent work experience from the auditee, but again, the confusion was on the auditee’s 
side, “forgetting” that the person was now there in a different role than before. If there 
were more similar conflicts, these were not brought up by  the interviewees. Integrity 
and ethics were either seen as non-issues, or discussed with some ambiguity. Seen in the 
light of the ongoing official treatment of the topics, this appears as fairly surprising. 
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Integrity and ethics appear to be taken for granted on an organisational and an 
individual level. 
As the SNAO works with a problem- oriented approach, it is fault-finding, but the fault-
finding takes place during environmental research and pre-studies. This strategy for PAs 
leaves space for more problem-resolving during, and after the evaluation process, and 
inclines the auditors’ own attitudes. Even in case C, which was the one that had the 
most summative character, interviewees expressed the desire to help the Government 
and Ministry  to do better. This signals a strong integrity  driven by the concern for the 
taxpayer’s money. The style was that of a sincere desire to safeguard the public interest 
on a matter. When the issue was small, the auditors‘ reactions to the limited influence in 
terms of recommendation acceptance was also low-key. When there was an issue that 
risked heavily overspending of public means, the auditors’ personal commitment to the 
issue and willingness to keep working with the auditee was still high, despite a 
governmental “let’s see”-response. The most summative of all the cases, with no 
possibilities for the auditors to influence the continued action on governmental and 
auditee level, was also the case that contained the harshest criticism towards the 
Government’s actions, and it was also the report that was described in the most finite 
way by the interviewees; “that was that, now it is up  to the Parliament to decide”. These 
results clearly indicate an overall strong public ethos as a result of the mission and 
mandate, as the rationale for overall auditor-auditee relation seems to be to safeguard 
the effective and efficient spending of public means, in accordance with the 
parliamentary directives for PA.
Research question 2: Were integrity  and an inclusive approach contradictive values in 
the performance audits? If not, how were they combined?
The Parliament’s directive for PA clearly  underlines that the SNAO should work 
“facilitating”. In practise, this means that the auditors are looking forward to a quite 
different work scenario, involving more contacts with the auditee and other stake-
holders. The results of this study confirms the theory  of auditors having an interest in 
keeping good relations with the auditee; such an approach matches the entire logic. A 
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respectful, to-the-point, approach makes it  easier to take initial contacts, to collect the 
necessary  and correct data, and to evaluate it in a reasonable factual way reducing the 
need for re-work during facts review round. A straight, transparent approach also seems 
to make the interaction easier when there is previous familiarity  between the auditor and 
the auditee, as well, reducing the risk of misunderstandings. It increases the likeliness 
for influence of the process and recommendations on an auditee level, and last but not 
least improves and maintains the image and esteem of the SNAO among auditees as 
well as in Parliament. The esteem of the SNAO and its mandate, in turn, appears to be 
important for the motivation of the auditors in their work. Reinforcing the image and 
esteem thus also reinforces the professional pride and makes it more rewarding to 
conduct the work. 
The basic presumption for this study was that an inclusive approach to auditees would 
be problematic for performance auditors in terms of integrity issues. The study  did not 
give clear indications, however, that an inclusive approach would be problematic for 
auditor independence and integrity. The main explaining factor for this seems to be the 
organisational strength of the SNAO. It is possible that  an inclusive approach risks the 
independence of a sole evaluator, but belonging to an independent collective seems to 
counteract this risk. Close collaboration in project groups gives more moral support to 
the performance auditors than official ethical guidelines. 
When the auditee showed resistance to the audit or insecurity about the performance 
auditors‘ purpose, the auditors were constantly attempting to put the auditees more at 
ease with the situation by dialogue. Here, the involving, formative approach helped to 
create a situation that allowed auditees to relax and learn from the available expertise. 
The relative freedom of the project groups, combined with the parliamentary direction 
for the PA focus in combination seemed to give the performance auditors possibilities to 
conduct their work in a way that allowed for handling of conflict situations. The role 
conflict between a summative auditor and a formative evaluator appeared to exist 
mostly  externally to the auditors themselves; among auditees, among Ministries and the 
Government. Since most  of the audit  cases did not involve much interaction between 
Ministries and auditors, there did not appear to be much integrity risks in that aspect. 
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Auditors were also not excessively concerned about what the Government or the 
Ministry in question would think; there was clarity regarding the institutional setting 
and the accountability of the SNAO. It is known that the SNAO works according to a 
problem-oriented approach, and fault-finding is thus expected. From the cases studied, a 
dual pattern of role interpretations appear. Leadership on auditee level and the 
Government appeared less pragmatic than the lower levels of the organisation, and 
appeared to have the “summative auditor” logic behind its reasoning to a higher degree. 
This confirms the co-existence of the many roles of the SNAO as an organisation, and 
the performance auditors. The performance auditor is fault-finding, problem-lifting, 
deliberating, and problem-solving. Appearing as less accusing and more facilitating is 
rational for the performance auditors.    
7 Discussion
Seen critically, interviewees giving an unproblematic account of the performance 
auditor role could be a strategy stemming from self-awareness and previous experience 
with researchers and journalists, and therefore the validity  of the results of this study 
could be questioned, as mentioned earlier. On the other hand, most of the interviewees 
had not experienced the controversies surrounding the SNAO in the late nineties. Role 
confidence appeared genuine, as did esteem in the own organisation and its mandate. It 
therefore appears to be a reasonable conclusion that the supposed role-confusion is 
primarily external. 
It is problematic however, in my view, that the topics of ethics and integrity are taken 
for granted on both organisational and individual levels. The question is how possible it 
is to control these aspects, and how desirable it  is to have a stricter steering. Indeed, 
there are already certain ethical guidelines for the behaviour of the auditors, but internal 
deliberation among project groups and quality  assurance appeared to be more important. 
A live discussion regarding the topic probably enhances the auditors‘ consciousness and 
group effort. On the flip-side of the coin, there is a risk that unsound norm-building 
around ethics could flourish in a project group. The SNAO should be aware of this risk 
and mitigate it by keeping a live discussion around ethics and integrity, well-anchored 
59
among the employees. Frequent varying of the project groups could be another way of 
counteracting integrity-risking sub-cultures. While the high degree of freedom that the 
performance auditors have places a great deal of trust in their professionalism, integrity 
and ethics should not be treated as non-issues. It is a positive sign that  the SNAO’s 
work with ethics is currently under review. 
One possibility  to why it appears to be difficult to approach the topics of ethics and 
integrity  at the SNAO could be the cultural context. Sweden is a state that is generally 
known for low levels of corruption. There is a widespread notion that it simply does not 
exist in Sweden, that integrity is something culturally inherent  to Swedish public 
administration. Coming from this context, there is a risk of being ethnocentrically blind 
to problematic situations that would put integrity at stake, to not name them 
“problematic”. Attempts to work with auditor ethics therefore have to make cultural 
sense, and deal with situations that are familiar to the performance auditors and that 
could occur in their work. For instance, bribes or attempted bribes are probably not so 
common among auditees in Sweden; the line is much finer than that. A suggestion for 
future research could be the auditees’ experiences with the auditors, as that seemed to be 
a sometimes conflictual area with regard to what the auditees could expect from the 
performance audit. 
The influence as a result from the PA process itself was frequently of more importance 
than Parliamentary action on the topic.  As seen in chapter three, this is expected with a 
more formative approach to performance audits. Knowledge transfer between the 
SNAO and the auditee occurs as a result of the SNAO conducting own research in order 
to back up their recommendations with alternative calculations and outright policy 
instruments. Although a single PA nearly never focuses on all of the three Es, a report 
that can show the financial benefits of the suggested recommendations is more 
persuading, also to the Parliament. It is positive that expert knowledge available at the 
SNAO can be transferred to the auditees, however there needs to be support for this 
kind of efforts, so that singular performance auditors do not find their commitment 
compromised, and their work hours torn between consultancy and performance 
auditing.  
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SNAO recommendations can work as an external force to shape government. The cross-
sectional focus and resulting recommendations often aimed at the government’s steering 
and handling of a policy problem can, indirectly, lead to the creation of new authorities. 
It is thus possible to see the SNAO’s actions as having some influence on the 
institutional set-up of the state. There is still, however, within the SNAO space for 
development of methods for studying new policy areas. New audit areas serve to drive 
the SNAO into a more diversified direction, and could mean that the SNAO’s role as an 
organisation diversifies, from being primarily  a state level actor to incorporate more 
levels of society when needed. With a diversifying role for the SNAO, there is a need 
for new kinds of competence. This can be solved by using external consultants, however 
the use of consultants might constitute an integrity  risk. There was one case in this study 
where the consultant had worked with the auditee previously to undertaking the 
performance audit. Such an assignment requires high levels of ethos and incorruptible 
integrity  from the consultant, as the person might find herself or himself in a situation of 
loyalty confusion. An increased use of consultants therefore must be carefully 
considered. On the other hand, there could be instances where the involvement of a 
consultant gives valuable inside information. 
This takes us to the more general consideration of whether independence or 
involvement is more valuable in a performance audit situation. The results from this 
study seem to indicate that the influence and utilisation of PA processes and reports is 
higher with a formative parliamentary directive and approach. This comes at the price 
of risked integrity, although the administrative authorities were rational in their 
approach. A problem is often known by the administrative authority staff, even if it is 
not recognised by leadership  or the Ministry. When a Ministry itself is auditee, a 
formative approach gets more problematic. It is debatable whether a formative approach 
is desirable in such cases.     
The SNAO appears to have a good ground of competence to stand on. Perhaps a more 
prominent challenge for performance audits in Sweden is how to raise more public 
attention to the reports, and the activities of the SNAO overall. A stronger connection to 
61
the Parliament or the public seemed to give more feeling of purpose to the interviewees, 
and plays an important role in motivating the norms of integrity and ethos. 
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Appendix 1: PA reports history, 2003-2011
Administrative Authority PAs, 
2003-20
11
Included in 
study
Arbetsförmedlingen (Swedish Public Employment Service)
Försäkringskassan (Social Insurance Office)
Rikspolisstyrelsen (National Police Board)
Socialstyrelsen (National Board of Health and
Welfare)
Ekonomistyrningsverket (Swedish National Financial 
Management Authority)
Länsstyrelsen - samtliga (County Administrative Boards - 
all)
Skatteverket (Swedish Tax Agency)
Högskoleverket (Swedish National Agency for Higher 
Education)
Naturvårdsverket (Environmental Protection Agency)
Åklagarmyndigheten (Swedish Prosecution Authority)
Försvarsmakten (Swedish Armed Forces)
Universitet och högskolor - alla (Universities and other 
institutes for higher education - all)
Domstolsverket (Swedish National Courts Administration)
Statens energimyndighet (Swedish Energy Agency)
Trafikverket (Swedish Transport Administration)
Finanspolitiska rådet (Swedish Fiscal Policy Council)
Lantmäteriet (Swedish Mapping, Cadastral and Land 
Registration)
Migrationsverket (Swedish Migration Board)
Polismyndigheter - samtliga (Police Authorities - all)
Statens skolverk (Swedish National Agency for Education)
Statistiska centralbyrån (Statistics Sweden)
Styrelsen för internationellt utvecklingssamarbete (Swedish 
International Development Cooperation Agency)
Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap (Swedish 
Civil Contingencies Agency)
Försvarets materielverk (Swedish Defence Materiel 
Administration)
Kustbevakningen (Coast Guard)
Riksgälden (Swedish National Debt Office)
28 x
24 x
19
16 x
14 x
14
12
10 x
10
9
9
9 x
8
8
8 x
7
7
7 x
7
7
7
7
6
5
5
5 x
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Appendix 2: Interview questions
1. Kan du berätta kort om din tid vid SNAO och ditt  arbete där? (Could you briefly 
describe your time at the SNAO and your work there?)
2. Hur ser du på din roll som revisor vid SNAO? (How do you view your own role as 
an auditor at the SNAO?) 
3. Vilket stöd har du som revisor i din granskning, när det gäller hur du ska förhålla dig 
till granskningsobjektet? (What kind of support do you have as an auditor, when it 
comes to how you should relate to the audit object?)
4. Brukar du följa upp rapporter som du är med och skapar? (Do you usually follow up 
on reports you take part in creating?)
5. Brukar du reflektera i förväg över dina egna tankar och åsikter om GO? (Do you 
reflect about what your own thoughts and opinions are about  the audit object before 
you go into the project?)
6. Berätta om den aktuella granskningen och din roll i den. (Can you tell me about this 
particular PA and your own role in it?)
7. Hur kom det sig att du började arbeta med granskningen och vad var dina tankar 
kring denna uppgift? (What made you start working with the audit and what were 
your thoughts about this task?) 
8. Har du granskat nämd organisation tidigare? (Have you had previous experience in 
auditing this particular audit object?) 
9. Hur togs ni som granskare emot av de granskade organisationerna? Kan du ge 
exempel på detta? (How were you received at the audited organisations? Could you 
give examples of this?) 
10. Vad var kommentarerna från den granskade organisationen/ de granskade 
organisationerna?  (What were the comments from the auditees?)
11. Vilken hänsyn togs till kommentarerna från GO? (What kind of concerns did you 
take of their comments?) 
12. Vad tror du att  granskningen fick för konsekvenser i den/de granskade 
organisationen/ organisationerna? (What consequences do you think the audit led to 
within the audited organisations?)
13. Vad anser du om mottagandet och behandlingen av denna rapport? (How did you 
feel about the receival and treatment of this report?) 
14. Vad anser du vara de främsta skälen till att rapporten togs emot som den gjorde av 
GO, Regering, Riksdag? (What do you consider to be the main reasons for why the 
report had the receival it did, by the auditee, the Government, and the Parliament?) 
15. Har du något du vill tillägga som vi inte tagit  upp? (Do you have anything to add, 
that we have not yet brought up?) 
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